From APTs to advanced persistent biological threats (APBTs): a taxonomy and large-scale metadata audit of genomic surveillance infrastructure
En palabras de los autores
Open genomic repositories have become critical infrastructure for pathogen surveillance, variant tracking, outbreak reconstruction, and public health decision making. However, many of these repositories were designed to support rapid scientific data sharing rather than adversarial verification, creating potential security gaps. This paper introduces Advanced Persistent Biological Threats (APBTs), as a framework for understanding how malicious cyber biological actors can gradually disrupt genomic surveillance without entering a laboratory or releasing a biological agent. Instead of altering biological material, an attacker targets the sequence data, metadata, reference datasets, and analytical models used by surveillance systems. We present, to our knowledge, the first integrated multilayer taxonomy of APBTs, structured around a four phase lifecycle, and investigate whether the metadata weaknesses identified by this framework are present in an operational genomic repository. To assess this, we audited 100,000 SARS-CoV-2 BioSample records obtained from the NCBI. A framework of 23 checks was applied across five metadata layers: temporal, geographic, host and specimen, provenance, and technical metadata. Every record triggered at least one APBT relevant metadata vulnerability indicator, with a mean of 7.34 indicators per record (SD = 1.34). Overall, 97.3% of records were classified in the High or Critical severity categories. Every record also contained at least one indicator in both the provenance and technical metadata layers. These results largely reflect the optional status of several fields in the current BioSample submission model rather than isolated errors by individual data contributors. Temporal and geographic information was comparatively complete, while fields needed for provenance reconstruction, chain of custody assessment, technical validation, and analytical interpretation were frequently missing. These findings do not indicate deliberate manipulation. However, the structural incompleteness of BioSample metadata creates vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit to introduce poisoned, misleading, or weakly traceable metadata into genomic repositories. As a result, maliciously altered metadata can appear plausible, remain undetected, and influence downstream genomic analysis and surveillance. The findings therefore show that widely used pathogen genomic repositories already contain structural weaknesses that can support metadata poisoning as part of an APBT operation.
En palabras simples Resumen con IA
Cada registro mostró al menos una vulnerabilidad, con un promedio de 7.34 problemas cada uno, y el 97.3% fueron clasificados como de severidad Alta o Crítica. Estas brechas provienen de campos opcionales en el sistema de envío, no de errores individuales, y podrían permitir que atacantes inserten datos engañosos que parecen legítimos. Los autores concluyen que los repositorios genómicos ampliamente utilizados ya contienen debilidades estructurales que podrían apoyar ataques de envenenamiento de metadatos.
Escrito por Kimi K2.5 usando solo el abstract de arriba. Jev verificó que cada oración esté respaldada por las oraciones del abstract que cita y eliminó las que no. Pasá el cursor por una oración para ver de dónde sale. Se eliminaron 2 oraciones por no estar respaldadas por el abstract.
Apareció: lunes, 12 de octubre. bioRxiv. Preprint, todavía sin revisión por pares.